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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

9 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, State (INR)
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[redacted] 25X1

SUBJECT: CHINESE COMMUNIST GROUND THREAT AGAINST INDIA

1. The attached draft study of the Chinese Communist Ground Threat to India is forwarded for review. This assessment is based on the initial DIA contribution and also reflects subsequent consultations between DIA and CIA staff specialists.

2. It is requested that your representatives meet with us at 1000, Wednesday, 17 April at CIA Headquarters to discuss this draft. USIB target date is 24 April.

[redacted] 25X1

Executive Officer
National Estimates

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S-E-C-R-E-T

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9 April 1963

SUBJECT: CHINESE COMMUNIST GROUND THREAT AGAINST INDIA

OBJECT

The object of this study is to examine the maximum offensive capabilities over the next few months of Communist China's ground forces against India and the Himalayan border states. It does not assess what the Chinese could do were they to undertake a long-term program of roadbuilding and stockpiling nor does this study estimate Chinese Communist intentions.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Chinese Communist forces presently in the Sino-Indian border area consist of 3 divisions, 13 regiments, 5 border defense regiments, and administrative and support troops totaling 120,000 men. A major offensive effort against India would require the

redeployment of several divisions from elsewhere, which the Chinese could do without seriously jeopardizing their overall military posture.

B. Supplies for Chinese Communist military forces in southwest Sinkiang and Tibet are transported by road from rail-served base depots at Chengtu in Szechwan, Lanchou, and Hsiatung in Kansu, and in the vicinity of Urumchi in Sinkiang. From these railheads supplies are moved into the frontier area by motor transport over long and difficult routes, thus limiting the quantities of supplies which can be delivered.

C. We estimate that the Chinese could deliver 1,600 tons per day. This rate of delivery, assuming the establishment of substantial reserves in the forward areas would be sufficient on a continuing basis to satisfy the daily resupply requirements of 225,000 troops. Of the total supplies deliverable to Tibet and southwest Sinkiang, enough could be moved to forward areas all along the frontier to support an attacking force of approximately 175,000 men. We believe, however, that in the feasible avenues of attack, due to operational and logistic problems the Chinese would employ a force of 123,000 men. The tonnage of 1,600 tons per day also could support air operations consuming approximately 450 tons

daily. Attacks by 175,000 troops would tax China's motor transport capabilities and would be a heavy drain on POL supplies. The delivery of tonnages to support these operations over the period of a year would require approximately 600,000 tons of motor gasoline, about 40 percent of the total available in all of China in 1962.

D. We believe that the main threat to India and the Himalayan border states consists of Chinese capabilities to attack in Ladakh, through the border passes between Ladakh and Nepal into India, into Nepal, and across Bhutan and the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) into northern Assam. We estimate the forces employed in these attacks would consist of 5 light infantry divisions, 15 independent infantry regiments, and 2 airborne battalions totaling 123,000 troops.

E. We estimate that the Chinese, should they launch the attacks described above, would have the following military objectives:

a. In Ladakh, to extend Chinese control to include the capture of the important center of Leh.

b. In the border area between Ladakh and Nepal, to seize the Chinese territorial claim north of Josimath.

c. In Nepal, to seize the major valley approaches and the city of Katmandu.

d. In the east, to occupy NEFA and that part of Assam north of the Brahmaputra River. To accomplish this the Chinese could either temporarily occupy the key communications centers of Siliguri and Hasimara, or effect a strong lodgement in the Gauhati area. We believe the Chinese would be more likely to choose the latter.

F. The next favorable periods for offensive operations begin in May for the avenues of approach west of Katmandu and in September for the avenues east of Katmandu.

DISCUSSION

I. GENERAL

1. With 2.6 million men the Chinese Communist army is the second largest, after that of the USSR, in the world, and has proven, under certain circumstances, to be an effective fighting force. There are several factors, however, which we believe are causing the Chinese Communist leaders concern as to the ability of their armed forces adequately to support China's foreign policies. Now virtually without supply and support from the USSR, obsolescence and wear and tear has caused a decline in the effectiveness of the armed forces equipment and weapons. We believe that China's industry cannot produce enough of the heavier and more complex equipment -- notably aircraft and naval ships and possibly armored fighting vehicles -- to maintain present equipment levels. Peiping also probably sees several situations, in addition to the border dispute with India, as requiring a high level of effective military preparedness: i.e., the situations in Laos, Vietnam, the Taiwan Strait and North Korea. Even the Sino-Soviet dispute will probably place additional demands on Chinese military dispositions and capabilities, since one of the attributes of China's new "independence"

from the USSR will be the need to watch over the long Sino-Soviet border more closely than to date.

2. China's troop dispositions are directed toward coastal and border defense. A secondary mission for all units is internal security, and, in some areas such as Tibet, this function has been the main occupation of the units stationed there. The Chinese now have in the Sino-Indian border area 3 divisions, 13 regiments, and 5 border defense regiments, totaling 120,000 men.[1/] Eleven armies[2/] are stationed in north, east, and central China and could be drawn upon to reinforce the frontier area. A major offensive effort against India would require the redeployment of several divisions, but, under present circumstances, the Chinese Communists could do this without seriously jeopardizing China's overall defense posture.

1/ These forces are composed of 3 infantry divisions, 11 independent infantry regiments, 1 cavalry regiment, 1 artillery regiment, and 6 border defense regiments.

2/ The Chinese Communist "army" resembles in size a US corps, its basic tactical components consisting of three infantry divisions.

II. LOGISTICS

3. Supplies for Chinese Communist military forces in southwest Sinkiang and Tibet are transported by road from rail-served base depots at Chengtu in Szechwan, Lanchou, and Hsiating in Kansu and in the vicinity of Urumchi in Sinkiang. The facilities at these railheads are capable of handling the supply requirements of the maximum forces deployable in the Sino-Indian border area.

4. From the Chengtu transshipment point supplies are delivered to the Changtu-Pangta area via the Szechwan-Tibet highway for distribution to forces located in eastern Tibet and along the frontier from Lima west to Milin. From Lanchou and Hsiatung supplies are moved over the Tsinghai-Tibet road to the Nagchhu Dzong and Yangpaching distribution depots serving west, central, and southern Tibet. From the Urumchi railhead goods move by road to a supply base at Kashgar and from there to units in the Yarkand and Ladakh areas. The Kashgar base probably also gives some support to troops located in extreme western Tibet.

5. Under optimum conditions a total of 2,000 tons per day could be delivered to the military subdistricts in southwest Sinkiang and Tibet. This tonnage, however, is unlikely to be

achieved during all periods of the year because of climatic factors. Therefore, it is estimated that the maximum sustained tonnage deliverable to supply distribution points in Tibet and southwest Sinkiang is 1,600 tons per day. The attacks described in this study would tax China's motor transport capabilities and be a heavy, although not insupportable, drain on POL supplies. The delivery of tonnages to support these operations over the period of a year would require approximately 600,000 tons of motor gasoline, about 40 percent of the total available in all of China in 1962. An effort of this size could not be supported if China were involved in military activity elsewhere.

6. This rate of delivery, assuming the establishment of substantial reserves in the forward areas, is sufficient on a continuing basis to satisfy the daily resupply requirements of 225,000 troops. Of the total supplies deliverable to Tibet and southwest Sinkiang, enough could be moved to forward areas all along the frontier to support an attacking force of approximately 175,000 men. However, we believe that the operational and logistic problems encountered in feasible avenues of attack are such that the Chinese would employ a force of 123,000 men. In addition to meeting the above ground force needs, the tonnage of 1,600 tons

per day also could support air operations consuming approximately 450 tons daily.

III. CLIMATE, TACTICS, AND EQUIPMENT

7. Although severe winter weather is an important factor in the conduct of military operations along the Sino-Indian border, low temperature and snow in themselves are unlikely completely to prohibit activity. More serious problems arise from melting snow and ice and heavier precipitation in spring and summer. Mid-October to mid-December is the most favorable period for operations all along the border and road conditions will be at their maximum capacity during this time of the year, although in the western segment of the frontier as far east as Nepal, favorable conditions may begin as early as May.

8. In the western half of the frontier, which encompasses Ladakh, the high central Tibetan plateau and most of Nepal, the spring is a difficult season because melting snows make streams unfordable and flat-floored valleys are often flooded. The summer in this sector is generally favorable for operations except in Nepal, where heavy rains from the southwest monsoon cause landslides and swollen streams particularly along the access routes

from India. From December to March temperatures are severely low and winds, occasionally reaching gale force, not only make the cold difficult to endure but also fill the air with fine penetrating dust. Snowstorms and blizzards are frequent, especially in the mountains.

9. In the eastern segment of the frontier, extending from eastern Nepal through Sikkim, Bhutan, and Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) and, for purposes of this discussion, including Lhasa to the north and a narrow belt of the Brahmaputra River valley to the south, road conditions during the spring months of April and May will be only fair. Flooding, unfordable streams, and landslides may obstruct routes for short periods. June to September are the worst months for operations in the eastern segment of the frontier; roads in the Brahmaputra River valley and in the Lhasa area may be flooded and in NEFA, particularly in the eastern part, the southwest monsoon will reduce road capacities to a minimum.

10. In the Himalayan region the physiographic effects on operations are enormous, and the harsh environment requires modifications in organization, equipment, and tactics. The use of trucks, armor, and artillery is limited by the inadequate road

network. Maintenance problems are also increased. Troops tire easily, combat loads must be reduced, and daily march times and distances must be shortened. Animal tranport and porters are relied upon heavily. Logistics, communications, and the control of large units in coordinated operations are difficult.

11. Tactical movements require more detailed preparations than those at lower altitudes. Reconnaissance and security on the march require special attention. Tactical operations will rarely take place at an echelon above that of the regiment. The regiment and the battalion are the units usually employed along a single axis against a single tactical objective. Operations are characterized by infiltration, ambushes, wide flanking movements, and sudden concentrations for specific missions.

12. We believe the standard organization of the Chinese Communist infantry division has been modified to conform to the decentralized operational requirements of mountain operations. During the recent fighting on the border the Chinese used 120 mm mortars, 76.2 mountain guns, and recoilless rifles. The largest artillery piece likely to be employed south of the Himalayas is the 122 mm howitzer. Although tanks have been reported in Ladakh and in theChumbi Valley, there is no evidence that the Chinese have

large numbers of tanks in Tibet. We believe that only in southern Sikkim could tanks be employed in other than an assault gun and artillery role. It would be extremely difficult for the Chinese to move more than a few tanks on to the Indian plain.

13. The Chinese could employ airborne forces to seize an airfield required for resupply of advancing ground forces, or to prevent Indian redeployment, or to leap-frog Indian defensive positions. We estimate that not more than two battalions could be dropped in a single lift. Airborne troops could be staged at airfields at Kashgar, Hotien, Soche, Kaerhmu, Chengtu, and Kunming.

IV. AVENUES OF ATTACK

14. Although the maximum number of ground forces that the Chinese could employ and support logistically in simultaneous attacks all along the Sino-Indian border is estimated to be 175,000, we believe that, in the areas from which the main attacks against India and the Himalayan border states might come, a maximum force of 123,000 men is likely to be put into action. This force would consist of 5 light infantry divisions, 15 infantry regiments, and 2 airborne battalions. The attacks described in the following paragraphs are estimated at the greatest strength that logistic limitations and terrain restrictions will allow.

15. These attacks, we believe, would have the following military objectives:

a. In Ladakh an extension of Chinese control to include the capture of the important communications center and airbase at Leh.

b. In the border area between Ladakh and Nepal to seize the Chinese territorial claim north of Joshimath which would be a psychological threat to New Delhi.

c. In Nepal to facilitate the eventual occupation of the country by seizure of the major valley approaches and the capture of the city of Katmandu in order to forestall Indian intervention.

d. In the East the effective occupation of the NEFA and that part of Assam north of the Brahmaputra River. To accomplish this objective the Chinese could either temporarily occupy the key communications centers of Siliguri and Hasimara* or effect a strong lodgement in the Gauhati area. Of the two, we believe that the Chinese would choose to establish the Gauhati salient because it would not only effectively deny the Indians communications with northern Assam and at the same time greatly assist the Chinese advances into central and eastern NEFA, but also would be militarily the easier and less costly venture.

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* We estimate that the occupation of Siliguri and Hasimara would require two standard divisions and two light divisions. These forces would be additional to the figure of 123,000 troops and would bring the total attacking force to approximately 175,000.

A. In the West

16. Ladakh. In Ladakh the Chinese Communists completed a road from Sinkiang in 1957. From this road, they have constructed a number of feeder roads, including one in the west that roughly parallels the main road, which permit the movement of troops and supplies to outposts. In many places the valleys provide natural roadbeds that require little construction or maintenance to be made useable for motor transport. The approach routes from Ladakh converge on Leh across the Karakoram and Ladakh Ranges; through the Saser Pass (17,480 feet) to Panamik from the north and via Chushul and Shyok from the southeast. Of these, the latter, a motorable route, is by far the more favorable avenue of approach. From Leh the road twists across two great mountain ranges to Srinagar, the major Indian military base in Kashmir.

17. The road network leading from Sinkiang and western Tibet into Ladakh will support an estimated seven light infantry divisions. This capability exists for operations within Ladakh and north of the frontier; for operations into Indian territory, however, this support capability drops as motorable roads give way to pack trails and less than 7 divisions could be supported. Therefore, the magnitude of the Chinese threat in this region is limited by the logistic difficulties

that would be encountered in Indian territory, rather than by the number of troops that could be concentrated and supported on the Chinese side of the frontier.

18. The Chinese could launch the following attacks in the Ladakh area:

a. One infantry regiment could move from Daulit-beg-oldi through the Saser Pass to Panamik (120 miles), but since the pass is closed from December to May, the resupply of this regiment during the winter months would have to be accomplished by airdrop or by road from Chusul.

b. Given sufficient engineer support for road improvement, 1 light infantry division could be supported from the Chusul area, with 2 regiments advancing to Leh (100 miles) and 1 regiment supporting the northern thrust to Panamik by advancing up the Shyok River valley to the area of Tirit (100 miles).

c. Because of logistic limitations and the need to improve road systems as they advance, Chinese military objectives would probably be limited to an extension of their control of the Ladakh area to include the capture of the key communications center of Leh. We do not believe that the Chinese, in their initial attack, could advance beyond Leh.

19. The Border Passes Between Ladakh and Nepal. Along the border between the Chusul area in southern Ladakh and Nepal there are several passes through which Chinese forces could attack. Of these, the best avenues of approach, although they are narrow defiles subject to blockage by snow during the winter months, are through Shipki Pass (15,400 feet), Mana Pass (17,890 feet), Niti Pass (16,600 feet), and Lipulek Pass (16,750 feet).

20. After May, two infantry regiments could be supported in and advance through Shipki Pass to the vicinity of Chini (45 miles). Not more than three regiments could be moved through Mana and Niti Passes to Josimath (approximately 45 miles); and two regiments through Lipulek Pass to the general area of Dharchula (20 miles). Advances beyond Chini, Josimath, and Dharchula could not be logistically supported until the Chinese had improved the existing trails to accommodate one-quarter-ton vehicles. Further, we believe that because the Chinese probably would be unable to resupply by air during the winter months, the regiments would, therefore, be forced to withdraw north of the passes.

21. Nepal. The Chinese have built roads to within a few miles of the Sino-Nepalese border opposite the five major entry routes and they have good lateral communications along the entire frontier

from the Shigatse-Gartok road west to Tingri Dzong. Trails lead from these roads to all the passes, many of which are open for much of the winter.

22. It is estimated that the Chinese could airdrop up to 2 battalions to seize the Katmandu airfield, and could then within 5 to 7 days airland up to 1 lightly-equipped infantry division. They could support this force by air indefinitely, provided they retained tactical air superiority in the area. We estimate that by the utilization of pack animals and the mobilization of all available Tibetan and Nepalese porters the Chinese could support attacks by one infantry regiment through each of the following passes: through Naralagna Pass to Bajang; through Kore Pass to Dana; through Kyriong Pass to Nawakot; through Kodari Pass to Dhulikhel; and through Rakha Pass to Dingla.

23. We estimate that the Chinese could not occupy Nepal up to the Indian frontier, and their tenure of northern Nepal would be entirely dependent on stockpiling, their ability to sustain porterage operations through the northern passes in winter, and the retention of air supremacy over the Katmandu area.

B. In the East

24. The Sikkim Area. There are two converging avenues of approach from the Chumbi Valley through Sikkim to Siliguri. One, a motorable road, leads through Natu Pass (14,500 feet) via Gangtok and Kalimpong; the other, an unimproved road, crosses the frontier through Jelep Pass joining the former at Kalimpong.

25. We estimate that the Chinese could attack through the Natu and Jelep Passes with two light infantry divisions and advance to Gangtok (34 miles) without improving the roads. If the road capacities between the frontier and Gangtok were increased, which would require an estimated 6 to 10 weeks, a total of 3 light infantry divisions and 2 standard infantry divisions with armor could be supported in an advance to Siliguri (100 miles). In the initial attack not more than two airborne battalions could be dropped in rear of the forward Indian defensive positions.

26. If prepared to violate Bhutanese neutrality, the Chinese could turn the established Indian defensive positions in Sikkim by making an initial attack down the Torsa River valley which generally parallels the Bhutan-Sikkim border.

27. Logistic support of the larger forces required to hold the exposed Siliguri position during the winter months would be extremely difficult. Unless stocks of supplies were captured or airfields secured to support airlift operations, a withdrawal to the Darjeeling area and a reduction in strength to not more than one division would be necessary.

28. Western Bhutan. An undeveloped trail goes from Pari Dzong in Tibet through western Bhutan and joins the road connecting Paro Dzong to Hasimara. We estimate that the Chinese could advance to Paro Dzong with one division without improving the trail. If the trail were improved to permit the movement of vehicles, this division could be supported in an advance to Hasimara. Overland logistic support of this division in the Hasimara area during the winter would be possible provided stockpiling were carried out promptly. We estimate that the Chinese could employ up to two airborne battalions to seize the airfield at Hasimara at the same time that the infantry division moved out of the Himalayan foothills.

29. Eastern Bhutan and Western NEFA. There are two converging routes which cross Bhutan and form an approach to Assam: one from Lhakhang Dzong to Gauhati via Lhuntsi Dzong and Dewangiri; the other from Bum La to Gauhati via Towang, Tashigang Dzong, and Dewangiri.

30. In an advance through Bhutan the Chinese initially could support 2 infantry regiments at Tashigang Dzong (50 miles), and 2 infantry regiments at Lhuntsi Dzong (30 miles). After road improvements, the Chinese could maintain 3 light infantry divisions within Bhutan, or could advance to Gauhati (145 miles) with at least 2 divisions. The Chinese could drop two airborne battalions at the northern end of the Gauhati bridge, to destroy the bridge and delay Indian reinforcement. This attack into the Gauhati area could be supported by a diversionary attack against Indian defenses in Sikkim.

31. In northwest NEFA there is a motorable road which connects Bum La with Tezpur and which passes through Towang and Bomdi La. We estimate that, if the Chinese were to repeat their attack from Bum La to Bomdi La (90 miles) they could support two light infantry divisions at Bomdi La and advance with one of these divisions to Tezpur.

32. Central and Eastern NEFA. There are two avenues of approach across the McMahon Line into NEFA: in central NEFA from the border village to Longju south through the Subansiri River valley; and in eastern NEFA from Lima through the Luhit River valley via Walong.

33. A penetration in the central NEFA sector would be restricted to a distance over which porter supply lines could be operated. We estimate that, at a maximum, the Chinese could support two regiments in the Subansiri River valley up to 30 or 40 miles south of the border. In the eastern part of the NEFA the Chinese could initially support an attack by one light infantry division in the Luhit River valley as far west as Tepang. Subsequent to the development of a road to Tepang, which would require an estimated 8 to 10 weeks, the Chinese could support up to 3 light infantry divisions in this area and advance to Balamaghani with 1 of these divisions.

34. We estimate that the objective of a major attack in the East would be to disrupt Indian communications with Assam either by seizing the important communications centers of Siliguri and Hasimara, or by establishing a salient in the Gauhati area north of the Brahmaputra River. If the Chinese could improve the roads through Bhutan with sufficient speed to sustain their attack to Gauhati, they probably could stockpile sufficient supplies in this salient to support their troops throughout the winter period.

(C) APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A: ESTIMATED PERSONNEL AND MATERIEL OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST INFANTRY DIVISION (LIGHT) AND THE INDEPENDENT INFANTRY REGIMENT AS FOUND IN TIBET a/

ITEM	HQ AND STAFF	CHEM CO	SIG BN	RCN CO	ENGR BN	AT BN	AAAW BN	BAND	ORD PLT	ARTY REGT	INF REGT	TOTAL DIVISION (LIGHT)	IND INF RGT
Officers	210	9	41	10	39	54	57	1	1	207	352	1,685	352
Enlisted	710	134	283	129	443	364	376	37	37	1,290	3,791	15,176	3,791
Gun, 76.2mm, Mtn										24		24	6
Gun, AT 57/76mm						12					9	39	9
Mortar, 160-mm										12		12	4
Mortar, 120-mm											9	27	9
Mortar, 82-mm											27	81	27
Rcl Rfl, 57-mm											9	27	9
Rcl Rfl, 75-mm											9	27	9
RL, 90-mm											18	54	18
AAMG, 12.7-mm							24				9	51	9
HMG, 7.62-mm											45	135	45
LMG, 7-62-mm				9	18						117	378	117
SMG, 7.62-mm	112	18	18	112	42		77		4	203	919	3,343	919
Carbine, 7.62-mm	225	116	213		364		297		33	1,075	2,038	8,437	2,038
Pistol, 7.62-mm	169	7	36	7	31		45	2	1	146	414	1,686	414
Flamethrower		Unk										Unk	
Trk, Cargo, 6x6					12					24	7	57	7
Trk, Cargo, 4x2										12	1	15	1
Trk, ¼-ton, 4x4	2										1	5	1
Motorcycle	2	5				2						15	
Bicycle			15									15	
Cart							Unk			Unk	Unk	Unk	
Horse,Mule,or Camel	135+										189+	775+	Unk

a/ Strengths above are at 100% TOE. Units in Tibet are estimated to be at 85% TO strength.

(S) APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A: AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS AND LIFT CAPACITIES OF THE 13TH CCAF AIR DIVISION[a] TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN THE SINO-INDIAN FRONTIER REGION

AIRCRAFT TYPE[c]	RANGE/ RADIUS	INITIAL LIFT[b] CARGO (TONS) AIR-LANDED	INITIAL LIFT[b] CARGO (TONS) AIR-DROPPED	INITIAL LIFT[b] TROOPS AIR-LANDED	INITIAL LIFT[b] TROOPS AIR-DROPPED	SUSTAINED OPERATIONS[b] CARGO (TONS) AIR-LANDED	SUSTAINED OPERATIONS[b] CARGO (TONS) AIR-DROPPED	SUSTAINED OPERATIONS[b] TROOPS AIR-LANDED	SUSTAINED OPERATIONS[b] TROOPS AIR-DROPPED
IL-12/COACH	1,600/ 720	57.0	39.4	504	432	35.6	24.9	315	270
IL-14/CRATE	1,600/ 720	30.4	21.3	269	230	19.0	13.3	168	144
C-46/COMMANDO	1,600/ 720(est.)	133.9	93.8	1,120	896	84.0	58.8	700	560
TOTALS		221.3	154.5	1,893	1,558	138.6	97.0	1,183	974

a/ Only the 13th CCAF Air Division is considered trained and available for operations in the Sino-Indian Border Area.

b/ The above data is based on 80% serviceability for the initial lift and 50% serviceability for sustained operations.

c/ For single aircraft operations the following factors may be used: IL-12/COACH and IL-14/CRATE, 4,750 lbs. of cargo or 24 troops airlanded and 3,325 lbs. of cargo or 18 troops airdropped; C-46/COMMANDO, 12,000 lbs. of cargo or 50 troops airlanded and 8,400 lbs. of cargo or 40 troops airdropped.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B: DAILY RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CHINESE COMMUNIST INFANTRY DIVISION (STANDARD), THE INFANTRY DIVISION (LIGHT) AND THE INDEPENDENT INFANTRY REGIMENT a/

1. Infantry Division (Standard) (at 85% TOE)

	MAXIMUM (average combat)	MINIMUM (static, no action)
Class I (Rations)	24.6	24.6
Class II & IV (General Supplies)	22.3	2.0
Class III (POL)	28.0	7.0
Class V (Ammunition)	54.0	2.0
TOTALS	128.9	35.6

2. Infantry Division (Light) (at 85% TOE)

	MAXIMUM (continuous light combat)	MINIMUM (patrol actions only)
Class I (Rations)	23.6	23.6
Class II & IV (General Supplies)	21.5	2.0
Class III (POL)	3.1	nil (pack animals and porters only)
Class V (Ammunition)	28.0	2.0
TOTALS	76.2	27.6

3. Independent Infantry Regiment (at 85% TOE)

	MAXIMUM (continuous light combat)	MINIMUM (patrol actions only)
Class I (Rations)	7.6	7.6
Class II & IV (General Supplies)	7.0	.6
Class III (POL)	1.0	nil (pack animals and porters only)
Class V (Ammunition)	7.0	.6
TOTALS	22.6	8.8

NOTE: All figures are expressed in short tons.

a/ The supply requirements are based on the most likely employment of units. The standard division, we estimate, would be used only when terrain permitted the employment of armor. The supply requirements for the light division and independent infantry regiment are based on consumption rates for mountain fighting.